Sectoral shift, income distribution, and development by Yuki, Kazuhiro
Title Sectoral shift, income distribution, and development
Author(s)Yuki, Kazuhiro







WORKING PAPER NO. 69
Sectoral Shift, Income Distribution, 
      and Development
Kazuhiro Yuki, Kyoto University 
       February, 2003
4
Graduate School of Economics 




Sectoral Shift, Income Distribution, 
      and Development
Kazuhiro Yuki , Kyoto University
February, 2003
Sectoral Shift, Income Distribution, and Development
Kazuhiro Yuki* 
August, 2002
                             Abstract 
  There are two notable phenomena widely observed when an economy departs from 
an underdeveloped state and starts rapid economic growth. One is the shift of pro-
duction, employment, and consumption from the agriculture and unskilled-intensive 
service sectors to the manufacturing and skilled-intensive service sectors, and the other 
is a large increase in educational levels of its population. The question is why some 
economies have succeeded in such 'structural change', but others do not. In order to 
examine the question, we construct an overlapping generations model that explicitly 
takes into account the sectoral change and human capital accumulation as sources of 
growth. It is shown that a relatively equal initial wealth distribution, or to be more 
accurate, a sufficient size of 'middle-class' is a necessary condition for a successful sec-
toral shift. Once the economy initiates the 'take-off', the sectoral shift and human 
capital growth continue until it reaches the high-income steady state. However, when 
agricultural productivity is low, the economy does not succeed in the sectoral shift 
irrespective of the initial distribution. Thus sufficient agricultural productivity is a 
prerequisite for the success.
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There are two notable phenomena widely observed when an economy departs from an under-
developed state and starts rapid economic growth. One is the shift of production, employ-
ment, and consumption from the agriculture and unskilled-intensive service sectors to the 
manufacturing and skilled-intensive service sectors. The other is a large increase in educa-
tional levels of its population'. Since the manufacturing and skilled-intensive service require 
a larger pool of skilled labor, it is easy to see that they are related. The question is why some 
economies have succeeded in such ` structural change', but others do not. This is surprising 
considering the fact that there is the widely-held view that both industrialization and educa-
tion growth are keys to higher income and many policies have been proposed and attempted. 
In order to tackle the question, this paper constructs an overlapping generations economy 
that explicitly takes into account the sectoral change and human capital accumulation as 
sources of growth. 
  The model economy has two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing, the former hiring 
unskilled labor and the latter employing skilled labor and physical capital'. The focus of 
the analysis is on a typical developing economy that lacks enough agricultural productivity 
to rely on exporting agricultural products to boost its growth. Hence it is assumed that the 
market of agricultural goods is closed domestically. In contrast, the market of manufacturing 
goods, which is also used as capital goods, is open internationally. The assumption is made 
for two reasons. First, such an economy tends to export manufacturing goods since when 
its income level is low 3. Second, although accumulation of physical capital is an important 
issue for the economy too, the paper focuses exclusively on the sectoral shift and human 
capital accumulation'. In this way, the analysis is greatly simplified. 
  The initial situation is that people are largely engaged in agriculture and remain unskilled, 
while only a small portion of the population is in manufacturing and skilled. Since large room 
is not left for growth in the agriculture sector, the economy must accomplish the relocation of
  'Empirical facts on the sectoral shift are summarized in Syrquin (1988) and those on the education growth 
are surveyed in Schultz (1988). 
  2This assumption ismade for simplicity. As long as the manufacturing sector is more intensive in skilled 
labor and physical capital, the basic results remain unchanged. 
  iSee Syrquin (1988), p.233-235 for the evidence. 
  4Earlier theoretical ttempts in development economics such as Lewis (1954) concerned the problem of 
capital accumulation i industrialization ofa low-income economy
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resources from agriculture to manufacturing in order to achieve a higher standard of living. 
  An agent in the economy lives for two periods, the first as a child and the second as 
an adult. In childhood, he receives a transfer from his parent and allocates it between two 
investment opportunities, assets and education, in order to maximize his future income. 
The investment in education is required to become a skilled worker and is individually 
profitable, although it is costly'. The cost of education isthe cost of hiring skilled workers as 
teachers. Since loan markets are nonexistent, tuition must be self-financed6. Consequently, 
poor parents cannot make investments in educating their children despite its profitability, and 
the investment decisions are affected by family income. In adulthood, the agent earns income 
from work and assets, and spends on consumption of agricultural goods, manufacturing 
goods, and intergenerational transfers. Preferences are such that he consumes at least the 
subsistence level of agricultural goods independent of its price. This formulation implies 
that the income (and price) elasticity of demand for agricultural goods is less than one, 
while those for manufacturing oods and transfers are more than one, so the share of income 
spent on agricultural goods decreases with income growth. 
  Without an increase in skilled labor, the economy stays largely agricultural and its income 
remains low. Hence more people must be educated, but many of them are credit constrained 
and cannot make optimal investments. This is the difficulty the economy is facing when 
it tries to change the sectoral composition and achieve a higher income level. Under what 
conditions can such an economy succeed? 
  The first point of the paper is that a sufficiently equal initial wealth distribution, or to 
be more precise, an adequate initial size of `middle class' is a necessary condition for the 
sectoral change and economic growth 7. The requirement for the 'take-off' in this economy 
is. sizable wealth accumulation by a portion of unskilled workers so that their children can 
take education and get skilled jobs in manufacturing. The source of labor income of those 
unskilled workers is sales of agricultural goods, which is dependent on the price of agricultural 
goods. The price in turn depends positively on the number of skilled workers and aggregate 
  5Psacharopoulos (1994) shows that returns to education is higher in low-income nations especially at
primary and secondary education levels.   6Although t e cost considered in the model is tuition, foregone earnings are also important costs partic-
ularly in such a credit-constrained economy. The result is not affected by the inclusion of foregone earnings 
to the cost. 
  'Here the middle class means those who have nough wealth to take education.
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 assets, since more skilled labor implies higher demand and lower supply of the goods, and 
 larger assets accumulation leads to the higher demand. Thus, for the sectoral shift to start, 
 the proportion of people who have enough wealth to take education and aggregate. assets 
 must be above certain levels8. 
    If the initial wealth distribution is relatively equal, a larger portion of the population 
 becomes skilled workers, so the demand for agricultural goods is higher and its supply is 
 lower, resulting in higher agricultural price and unskilled wage. If the price level is above 
 the critical level, a richer portion of unskilled workers can send their children to school 
 .and the sectoral shift starts. Even when the price level is not high enough for the shift 
 initially due to low wealth accumulation, the larger pool of skilled workers make rapid 
 wealth accumulation possible, hence the price level rises to the critical evel eventually and 
 the industrialization starts. Once the sectoral change starts, it continues autonomously. An
 increase in the number of skilled workers raises the demand for agricultural goods, reduces 
 its supply, and increases assets accumulation. All contribute to a further increase in the 
 agricultural price and unskilled wage. This allows children of less affluent unskilled workers 
 to access education, causing the number of skilled workers to increase further, which raises 
 the price and the unskilled wage ven more. As long as the skilled wage (net of the cost of 
 education) is higher than the unskilled wage, this process continues. In the long run, the 
 economy reaches the state where the return from education isequated with that from assets, 
 thus equal opportunity is attained. 
    On the other hand, if the economy starts with a relatively small size of 'middle class', 
 skilled labor is scarce and hence the agricultural price is lower. Children of unskilled workers 
 are not financially able to obtain education and skilled labor does not increase. Still, if initial 
 assets accumulation is low, the relative price increases over time through assets accumulation 
 but never eaches the critical evel for the sectoral shift. Since skilled labor does not increase, 
 inequality between skilled and unskilled workers does not disappear and the investment 
 choices are affected by family income ven in the long run. 
    However, equal initial wealth distribution is not sufficient for the success. When there 
 is the sectoral shift of consumption and agricultural productivity is very low, the economy 
 ends up in a steady state with persistent inequality irrespective ofthe initial distribution. 
    8The required levels of 'middle class' and aggregate ssets are interrelated.
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Thus, sufficient agricultural productivity is a prerequisite for the sectoral shift. Since people 
have to consume at least subsistence levels of agricultural goods regardless of its price, when 
agricultural productivity is lower, its price becomes higher more than proportionally and the 
unskilled wage rises. The resultant lower return from education implies that the economy 
can sustain less skilled labor and aggregate assets. If agricultural productivity is below a 
certain level, the sustainable skilled labor and aggregate assets become smaller than the 
combination required for the 'take-off'. Therefore, in this case the industrialization never 
starts. 
  The arguments so far have assumed that productivity levels of both sectors are time-
invariant. The above results are mostly not affected by the introduction of productivity 
growth, as long as the cost of education increases with skilled wage9. An economy starting 
with very low agricultural productivity still finds it very difficult to 'take-off', irrespective of 
its initial wealth distribution. Now, a decreasing relative price of agricultural goods can be 
consistent with sectoral shift, if productivity growth in the agriculture sector is large enough. 
  Empirical findings largely support the model's implications, although the model abstracts 
from many realistic features for simplicity. The first point of the paper, importance of income 
distribution, especially size of 'middle class', in economic development has been backed by 
many studies. Adelman and Morris (1967) pointed out that middle classes were a driving 
force in the economic development of Western Europe. More recently, Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) regressed the average GDP growth rate over 1960-1985 for a cross-section f developed 
and developing countries on the share of income held by the third quintile of the distribution 
and found a positive coefficient. They also found a positive effect of the inequality measure 
using time series data for nine developed countries for the years 1830-1985. Further, using 
cross-sectional d ta from 1960s to 1990s, Easterly (2001) found that a larger size of 'middle 
class', measured as the share of income held by the second through fourth quintiles of the 
distribution, is associated with more education, especially at secondary education, higher 
income, and higher growthlo 
  The second point of the paper, sufficient agricultural productivity as a precondition for 
  'Since most of the (direct) cost of education is the cost of hiring teachers, this condition would be met 
in an actual economy. 
 '°He also found the association with better health, better infrastructure, better economic policies, less 
political instability, less civil war and ethnic minorities at risk, more social "modernization" and more 
democracy.
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successful sectoral shift, has not been formally tested, although there are several findings 
indirectly supporting the claim. Bairoch (1975) pointed out the large gap (about 45 percent) 
in agricultural productivity on average between European countries beginning their industrial 
revolutions and Africa and Asia in 1960s. Further, Hayami and Ruttan (1985) found a close 
positive association between overall output growth and agricultural productivity growth for 
Sub-Saharan African nations. These evidences suggest that agricultural productivity seems 
to be an important independent factor affecting economic development. 
  This paper is mainly related to two strands of literature. One is the literature that inves-
tigates mechanisms and outcome of sectoral change, such as Matsuyama (1992), Echevarria 
(1997), Kongsamut et. al. (2001), and Laitner (2000). Matsuyama investigates the role 
of agricultural productivity in economic development using a two-sector endogenous growth 
model and shows how openness of markets affects the relationship between productivity and 
growth. Using a Solow-type model with multiple consumption goods and non-homothetic 
preferences, Echevarria numerically shows that uneven productivity growth among sectors 
can lead to different aggregate growth rates at different stages of development. Kongsamut 
et.al investigates balanced growth paths of the model similar to Echevarria analytically. 
Laitner explains how an economy's measured average propensity to save rises in the course 
of industrialization by focusing on increasing importance of reproducible capital relative to 
land. 
  The other is the large literature that investigates the interplay between income distri-
bution and growth theoretically, which includes Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and 
Zeira (1993), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Benabou (1996a), (1996b), Benhabib and Rusti-
chini (1996), Durlauf (1996), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Aghion, 
Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa (1999), and Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000). Closely related 
are the papers by Galor and Zeira, and by Galor and Tsiddon, which show how credit con-
straints and lumpy investment in human capital can cause the interaction between initial 
distribution and long-run outcome of an economy in a. model with one final goods sector. 
There is no interaction between the unskilled wage and final demand in their model. 
  Resting on these earlier works, this paper provides one mechanism for growth through 
sectoral shift focusing on human capital accumulation and credit constraints, and shows how 
success of an economy is related to its income distribution and agricultural productivity.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model where sectoral shift of 
consumption is absent. Section 3 derives and analyzes the model's dynamics and Section 4 
presents and interprets the results from the basic model. In Section 5, the sectoral shift of 
consumption is introduced into the model and its implications for the results are examined. 
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Model 
2.1. Individual decisions 
Time is discrete and starts from 0. There is no uncertainty. The economy is composed of a 
continuum of individuals who live for two periods, the first period as children and the second 
period as adults.
2.1.1. Investment decisions 
In childhood, an individual receives a transfer from his parent. Then he allocates the trans-
ferred money for two investment options, assets and education, in order to maximize his 
future income". The educational investment is required to become a skilled worker and 
enjoy higher earnings in adulthood. The investment is a discrete choice, i.e. take education 
or not, incurs a fixed cost, and brings the difference between the skilled wage and unskilled 
wage as the gross return. Consider an individual who was born into lineage i in period t - 1. 
His generation is called generation t. Then, his education costs et, and its gross return is 
WH,t- WL,t in the next period, where WH,t and WL,t are the skilled and unskilled wages in 
period t, respectively. Assume that the education cost is the cost of hiring current skilled 
workers as teachers and it is proportional to WH,t_112. The investment must be self-financed 
because loan markets for such investment are not available in the economy. The other op-
tion, the investment in assets, is a continuous choice, and gives a gross return of 1 + rt for 
investment of one unit of income. It is easily shown that, in an equilibrium, the return from
 11Alternatively, one can suppose that the investment decisions are carried out by his parent in order to 
maximize his future income. 
 12Kendrick (1976) finds that teacher and student ime constitute about 90% of all costs of education. 
Further, World Bank (1983) notes that about 95% of current expenses inthe primary school systems of low 
income countries are teacher salaries.
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the investment i  education becomes atleast as high as the return from the investment i  
assets, i.e. 2WWH,t- WL,t > (1 + rt)et. 
  Suppose that the individual has received bZt units of income as a transfer f om his parent. 
He allocates the transfer between the investments in assets at and in education etin order 
to maximize his future income. If the return from investment in education is strictly higher 
than that from investment in assets, optimal investment choices are given by the following 
equations:
                              at = bzt, (2.1) 
                           eZt = 0, if bZt <et, 
                           and at = bt - et, (2.2) 
                              eZt = et, if bt > et. 
   On the other hand, if the returns are equated, i.e. WH,t- WL,t = (1 + rt)et, then the 
investment is determined by (2.1) when the transfer is less than the cost of education, while, 
when the transfer islarge nough for taking education, both (2.1) and (2.2) are optimal 
choices". Since innate abilities ofindividuals re identical, transfers solely determine the 
investment a d resulting occupational choices. 
2.1.2. Consumption and transfer decisions 
An adult individual, who is either askilled or unskilled worker depending on the human 
capital investment in the previous period, obtains income from assets and labor supply and 
spends the income on consumption and transfer to his child. Each adult is assumed to 
have a single child. There are two different consumption g ods, agricultural goods and 
manufacturing goods in the economy, the latter also being used as-capital goods. Note that 
the agricultural goods include unskilled-intensive ser ice goods such as petty retail trading 
and domestic service, and the manufacturing goods encompass skilled-intensive service goods 
like financial service and health care service. Assume that an adult individual of ineage i in 
 13Actually the relative return from education is determined as the result ofpeople's investment d cisions, 
since it depends on the numbers of skilled and unskilled workers in the conomy. More formal analysis of 
the investment d cision s described in the next section.
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generation t has the following preference: 
                            A,t)'YA((4f,t)ryn1(bt+1)1-7A-7ns, (2.3) Ut = (C 
where cA t and cnr,t are his consumption f agricultural goods and of manufacturing goods, 
respectively; bt+1 isthe transfer to his child (generation t +1); and '/A, ant are preference 
parameters. Denote the relative price of agricultural goods to manufacturing goods in period 
t by Pt. Then his budget constraint takes the following form: 
                    Pt CTA,t + cA.i,t +bZt+1 = ult + (I + rt)at, (2.4) 
where wt is his earnings. Note that wt + (1 + rt)at = wt + (1 + rt)bt, if bt < et, and 
ult-I-(1+rt)at=wH-(1+rt)et+ (1+rt)bt, ifbZt>et14. 
  Maximization f the utility function (2.3) subject to the budget constraint (2.4) gives 
the following consumption and transfer rules: 
                    PtcA,t = 'YA[wt +(1 + r't)at], (2.5) 
                       CM 't = 'YA.•r[wt + (1+ r't)a'], (2.6) 
               and bt+1 = (1 -'YA -'YNf)[wt + (1 + rt)at]. (2.7) 
2.1.3. Generational structure 
At the beginning of period t + 1, current adults pass away, current children become adults, 
and new children are born into the economy. Since each adult has one child, the population 
is constant over time. The population of each generation is normalized to be one. 
2.2. Production structure 
There are two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing, in the economy15. The agriculture sec-
tor employs unskilled workers to produce agricultural goods, and the manufacturing sector 
employs skilled workers and physical capital to produce manufacturing oods. The manu-
 14When the returns 'are equated, wH - (1 + rt)et + (1 +,1 t)ht = wt + (1 + 7 t)ht is satisfied. 
 15 As mentioned above
, the agriculture sector includes unskilled-intensive service sectors and the manufac-
turing sector includes skilled-intensive service sectors in real economy.
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factoring goods are used not only for consumption but also for investment in physical capital 
(capital goods). 
  The production functions of the two sectors are given as follows: 
                    Agriculture: YA,t = AtLt, (2.8) 
                 Manufacturing: Yhr,t = Aft (HAT,t)a"`(Kt)1-«"L (2.9)
In the above expressions, YA,t and YM,t are outputs of agricultural goods and manufacturing 
goods, respectively; At and M1t are the productivity levels of the respective sectors; Lt is 
the number of unskilled workers in agriculture; Hn.1,t is the number of skilled workers in 
manufacturing; and Kt denotes physical capital employed in manufacturing. To focus on 
main mechanics of the model, in most parts of the paper, the productivities At and Mt are 
assumed to be constant over time, so the productivity levels are set to be equal to At = A 
and Mt = M. As described later, the main results of the model with constant productivities 
go through even if exogenous productivity growth is introduced. 
  The assumptions that unskilled workers are employed only in agriculture, and skilled 
workers and physical capital are employed only in manufacturing are made for simplicity. 
Provided that the agriculture sector is more intensive in unskilled labor and the manufac-
turing sector is more intensive in skilled labor, the outcome from the model remains mostly 
unchanged.
I
2.3. Market structure and determination of prices 
Suppose that the markets for agricultural goods and for labor are closed domestically and 
their prices are determined within the economy, while manufacturing goods and physical 
capital are freely mobile internationally. As explained in the introduction, this paper focuses 
on developing economies that do not have sufficient agricultural productivity to rely on 
exports of the goods for income growth. In such economies, it would be reasonable to consider 
the market for agricultural goods as closed, since effects of international commodity markets 
on domestic markets tend to be small. The assumption of open markets for manufacturing 
goods and for physical capital is made partly because it is more realistic than the other
G
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extreme of the closed markets for such an economy16. Perfect capital mobility is assumed 
also to focus on human capital accumulation rather than physical capital accumulation as a 
source of growth. These assumptions simplify the analyses significantly. 
  From the assumptions, the interest rate is fixed at the world interest rate rt = r, so the 
skilled wage wH is given by the following equationl7. 
                          WH=am,M«»t (1-~"`)««»L_1. (2.10) 
T The wage rate is exogenous, and without technological growth and fluctuations of the world 
interest rate, it is constant over time. The wage of unskilled workers is equal to,
WWWL,t = PtA, (2.11)
hence it depends on the relative price of agricultural goods to manufacturing goods, Pt. 
  The relative price is determined by the market clearing condition of agricultural goods. 
The demand for agricultural goods is total consumption of the goods by the adult population, 
which is the sum of individual consumption (2.5) over the population. So the market clearing 
condition becomes,
PtALt = 'YA[wL,tLt + wHHt + (1 + r)KD]. (2.12)
  In the above equation, Ht is the total number of skilled workers in the economy, which 
is the sum of Hn.I,t and. HE,t, skilled workers in the education sector18, and KD is total
 16As mentioned in the introduction
, such an economy tends to start exporting manufacturing goods while 
its income level is very low. Also, compared to unskilled-intensive service goods such as domestic service, 
skilled-intensive service goods such as financial service are likely to be more tradable. 
 17From the first order conditions of the profit-maximizing problem of the manufacturing firm, the following 
two equations are derived. 
                                                               Hni,t «„L 
                              rt = (1-a„~)M( K
t) , 
                           and wHt = a„,M( Kt 
, 
                                                   Hhr ,t 
Solving the first equation f rxt ` , substituting it into the second equation, a d setting rt = r gives the 
expression in the main text. 
 18Remember that it is postulated that the cost of education is the cost of hiring skilled workers as teachers.
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physical capital held domestically. Note that KD can be different from total physical capital 
in the economy, Kt, since capital is freely mobile internationally. Substituting (2.11) and 
Ht + Lt = 1 19 into the above equation and solving for Pt, the relative price of agricultural 
goods is given as follows: 
                  Pt = 'YA [wHHt + (1 + r)KD] . (2.13)                       1-7A A(1-Ht) 
The relative price Pt increases with the number of skilled workers Ht and with domestically 
held physical capital KD. Larger Ht and KD imply higher total income and larger demand 
for agricultural goods, and larger Ht (smaller Lt) implies lower supply of the goods, hence 
resulting inhigher Pt. Since WL,t = PtA, the unskilled wage is also increasing in Ht and KD. 
   For the analyses in later sections, it is convenient to express the relative price as a 
function of Ht and aggregate intergenerational transfers, Bt. This is done by substituting 
KD = Bt - eHt into the above quation (2.13)20: 
               Pt - 'YA {[wH -(1 .+ r')e]Ht + (1 + r)Bt} . (2.14)                    1-1'A A(1-Ht) 
The relative price and the unskilled wage are increasing in both Ht and Bt. To express the 
dependency of Pt and WL,t on Ht and Bt, they are denoted as P(Ht, Bt) and wL(Ht, Bt), 
respectively. 
  The markets of manufacturing goods and of capital are not closed domestically and 
differences between demands and supplies of the goods are financed through net imports 
from foreign economies. 
3. Dynamics 
The previous section has described the model and derived the equilibrium conditions. In the 
model economy, individuals live only for two periods and participate in each market for one 
period alone. As a result, only one generation participate in markets each period and they 
 19This equation is satisfied since the size of each generation is normalized to be one. 
 20The relation is satisfied since current skilled workers have spent e on education out of their received 
transfers in the previous period. Note that the cost of education eis time-invariant because the skilled wage 




do not attend markets in past or future periods. Hence, the model can be considered as a 
sequence of static economies. 
   What connects these static economies across periods are the intergenerational trans-
fers. Because of the credit constraint, transfers directly affect individuals' investment and 
occupational choices, and consequently consumption and transfer decisions. Further, the 
distribution of transfers over the population determines a proportion of individuals who can 
afford to take education, and thus it affects the relative return from education and invest-
ment decisions. The distribution also affects supplies and demands of goods, their prices 
and allocations. Hence, in general, the time evolution of the distribution of transfers must 
be examined in order to understand how the structures of the economy, that is, production 
and employment shares of each sector, total output, wages of skilled and unskilled workers, 
and income distribution, change over time. 
  This section first derives the dynamic equation relating current transfers to the next 
period's transfers within a lineage (individual dynamics). The dynamics depend on the time 
evolution of the distribution of transfers over the population. However, it turns out that the 
qualitative nature of dynamics of two aggregate variables, which does not require detailed 
information on the distribution, is enough to derive implications of the model. So the 
dynamics of the two aggregate variables are characterized next. Although the two dynamics 
interact, for exposition, initially the dynamics of each variable are analyzed fixing the other, 
then the both dynamics are analyzed together by introducing a phase diagram. 
3.1. Individual dynamics 
Consider an individual born into lineage i in period t - 1, who belongs to generation t. 
He allocates the transfer b between i vestments in assets at and in education etso as to 
maximize his future income. If the transfer isless than the cost of education, i.e. Mt < e, 
the transfer is spent only on assets and he becomes an unskilled worker as described above. 
On the other hand, if the transfer isat least as large as the cost of education, i.e. bt > e, 
the investment decision is more complicated. Since investment decisions of others affect the 
unskilled wage wL(Ht, Bt) and the relative return from education, he has to take into account 
their actions in making the decision. The key variable affecting the decision is the fraction 
of individuals in generation t who have received transfers bt larger than e, Frt. In short,
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when only small numbers of indivi 
and become skilled; when many ind 
skilled but others not.
deals can afford education, all of them take education 
ividuals have access to education, some of them become
3.1.1. Unequal opportunity case 
When the proportion of individuals who can afford to take education is small, the return from 
education is higher than the return from assets even if all of them actually take education, 
i.e. WH - (1 +r)e > wL(Frt, Bt). In this case, the individual al ocates the transfer btbetween 
investments i  assets at and in education et in the following manner: 
                            at = bt, (3.1) 
                         et = 0, if bt < e, 
                         and at = bt - e , (3.2) 
                         et = e, if bt > e. 
From the above equations, it is clear that all young individuals who are financially eligible for 
education become skilled workers, hence Ht = Frt is satisfied. Since transfers from parents 
constrain available investment opportunities and the return from the investments, this case 
is called the unequal opportunity case. 
  In the next period, the individual, given asset at and acquired ability (skilled or unskilled), 
determines the amount of transfers tohis child '4t+1 according to(2.7). By substituting the 
above investment rules into the transfer rule (2.7), the dynamic equation linking the received 
transfer ht to the transfer given to the next generation bit+1 is derived. 
  If he is a skilled worker, i.e. ht > e, the equation takes the following form, which is 
obtained by substituting (3.2) into (2.7): 
           bt+1 = b3(bt) =(1 -'YA -'Ynr){wH +(1 + r)(bt = e)}. (3.3) 
The assumption (1 - -YA -'yAf)(1 + rt) < 1 is made so that the fixed point for the equation 
(b )* = 1-'YA-4 [w - (1 + r)e] exists.   s - 1-(1-ryA--YM(1+r) H 





bt+1 = bs (bzt )
                                      Shift, upward as 
                                        Frt a d Bt increase 
                              
i b7t, = bu (btt; Frt, Bt) I 
1 
                   45° 
                0 i                                          u rt, t b                                                                                 * t
s 
           Figure 3.1: Individual dynamics of intergenerational tr nsfers 
and Ht = Frt into (2.7) : 
            bzt+1 = bu(bzt; Frt, Bt) = (1 -'YA -'YM){wL(Frt, Bt) + (1 + r)bzt}, (3.4) 
           where 
      wL(Frt, Bt) = P(Frt, Bt)A, (3.5) 
                 7A {[WH -(1 + r)e]Frt + (1 + r)Bt} (3
.6)                       1--YA (1-Frt) 
The dynamic equation for an unskilled worker does depend on aggregate variables Ht = 
Frt and Bt, since they affect the relative price of agricultural goods, thus the unskilled 
wage. The fixed point of the equation for given Frt and Bt is denoted by, bu(Frt, Bt) 
1-(117AA7M)(1+T)wL(Frt, Bt) 21 
  The dynamics of intergenerational transfers of a currently skilled worker b41 = bs(bzt) 
and of a currently unskilled worker bt+1 =bu(bt; Frt, Bt) for given Frt and Bt are depicted 
in Figure 3.1. As long as WH - (1 + r)e > wL(Frt, Bt) is satisfied, b"                                              t+1=bu(bt;Frt,Bt)is
located below bzt+1 = bs(bt), but as Frt and Bt, hence P(Frt, Bt) and wL(Frt, Bt) increase, it 
shifts upward. 
 21 In general, this is not the long-run transfer level of a lineage of a currently unskilled worker, since his 
descendants may become skilled workers and Frt and Bt may change over time. Although this fixed point 








3.1.2. Equal opportunity case 
Next consider the case where many individuals can afford education so that the return from 
education fails to be higher than the return from assets, if all of them invest in education, 
i.e. wH - (1 + r)e < wL(Frt, Bt). In this situation, the number of skilled workers Ht is 
determined at the point where the two returns are equated, that is, Ht is the solution of 
WH - (1 + r)e = wL(Ht, Bt). Now not all of financially eligible individuals take education 
and become skilled workers, i.e. Ht < Frt. Since the return from the investments does not 
depend on transfers from parents, this case is named the equal opportunity case. Dynamics 
of transfers ofboth skilled and unskilled workers are described bythe single quation bZt+1 = 
bs(bt) 
            bZt+1 = bs(bt) _ (1 - -YA -'Ynr){wH + (1 + r) (bli - e)}. (3.7) 
In Figure 3.1, this is the situation where P(Frt, Bt) is large nough t at bt+l = bu(b4t; Frt, Bt) 
coincides with b' bs (ht). 
3.1.3. Dividing line 
The economy belongs to either of the two cases depending on Frt and Bt. The combination 
of Frt and Bt satisfying WH - (1 + r)e = wL(Frt, Bt) is the dividing line, and it is obtained 
by substituting Pt = [wH - (1 + r)e]/A and Ht = Frt into (2.13) and solving the equation 
for Frt: 
                Frt = He(Bt) _ (1 -'YA) - 'YA(1 + r)Bt (3.8)                             [
w -(1+r)e] 
The unequal opportunity case corresponds to Frt < HC(Bt), while the equal opportunity 
case amounts to Frt > He(Bt). 
3.1.4. Summary 
The analysis of this subsection can be summarized as follows. When a relatively small 
number of individuals have enough wealth to take education, i.e. Frt < He(Bt), the return 




Then, all those who have received bt > e become skilled workers, i.e. Ht = Frt, and 
their transfers to the next generation are determined bybt+l = bs(bt). Those who have 
received bt< e become unskilled workers and the dynamics oftransfers are governed by 
bt+l = bu(ht, Frt, Bt). This case has been amed the unequal opportunity case since WH -
(1 + r)e > WL(Ht, Bt) is satisfied. 
  In contrast, when many individuals can afford education, i.e. Frt > He(Bt), the number 
of skilled workers Ht is determined so that the returns from the two investment opportunities 
are equated, i.e. WH - (1 + r)e = wL(Ht, Bt). Hence this case has been called the equal 
opportunity case. In this case, those who have received bZt > e become either skilled or 
unskilled workers, i.e. Ht = He (Bt) < Frt, those who have received bt< e become unskilled 
workers, and transfers ofboth workers follow b' bs (b'). 
3.2. Aggregate dynamics 
What has become clear now is that the individual dynamics depend on dynamics of two 
aggregate variables, aggregate transfers Bt and the fraction of individuals who have received 
transfers 14 larger than the cost of education e,Frt. These dynamics in turn depend on 
the time evolution of the distribution of transfers, which is quite difficult to characterize. 
However, in order to derive the main implications of the model, the information on the 
distributive dynamics is not needed and the qualitative nature of the dynamics of the two 
aggregate variables is enough. Thus this subsection analyzes the dynamics of the two aggre-
gate variables qualitatively. For exposition, first each of them is examined separately fixing 
the other's dynamics, then their interaction is taken into account at the end. 
3.2.1. Dynamics of aggregate transfers 
Here the dynamics of aggregate intergenerational transfers Bt are examined for given Frt. 
First, consider the unequal opportunity case, i.e. Frt < He(Bt). As seen in the previous 
subsection, in this case, WH - (1 + r)e > wL(Ht, Bt) and Ht = Frt hold. The dynamic 
equation of aggregate ransfers Bt+1 is given by the following equation, which is obtained 
by aggregating individual dynamics of skilled (3.3) and of unskilled workers (3.4) over the
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population and using Ht = Frt: 
      Bt+1 = B(Frt, Bt) = 1 1'A - 7AI {[wH - (1 + r)e]Frt + (1 + r)Bt}. (3.9) 
                                     1 -'YA 
The dynamics of Bt+1 are dependent o  Frt. The assumption 1-1- M (1 +r) < 1 is made so 
that there xists afixed point for the equation given Frt 22, where the fixed point B*(Frt) 
is defined as, 
         B*(Frt) - 1 1 - -YA - 7M [wH - (1 + 7•)e]Frt. (3.10) 
                      1 _ 1-'YA-Yn2 (1 + r) 1 - TA 
                                            1--YA 
Higher Ht = Frt implies higher total income (measured in terms of manufacturing goods), 
since (i) skilled wage is higher than unskilled wage, and (ii) an increase in total labor income 
of skilled workers raises the demand for agricultural goods, the relative price of agricultural 
goods, and the relative wage of unskilled workers. The higher total income then increases 
the demand for assets, resulting in higher Bt+1 = B(Frt, Bt) and B*(Frt). 
  Alternatively, inthe equal opportunity case where wH - (1 +r)e < wL (Frt, Bt) is satisfied, 
WH - (1 + r)e = wL(Ht, Bt), i.e. Ht = Hc(Bt), holds in an equilibrium. In this case the 
dynamics of Bt+1 are described by Bt+1 = B(He(Bt), Bt), which is obtained by substituting 
Ht = He(Bt) into Bt+1 = B(Ht, Bt): 
      Bt+1 = B(He(Bt), Bt) - (1 -'YA -'Ynr){[wH - (1 + r)e] + (1 + r)Bt}. (3.11) 
The fixed point of this equation B** is, 
               B** = 1 - 1'A -'Yh1 1 - (1 'YA - 'ynr)(1 +7) [wH - (1 + r)e], (3.12) 
- which is equal to (b8)*. The number of skilled workers at B**, H** - H(B**) is given by, 
                H** He(B**) = (1 -'YA) - [
wH - (1 + r)e] 
                                      _ 'YA                       [1 1- (1 -'YA - -YM)(1 + r)]. (3.13) 
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       Figure 3.2: Dynamics of aggregate transfers when Frt = Frlow and Frhigh 
  Figure 3.2 displays the dynamics of aggregate transfers when Frt is equal to Frlow and 
Frhigh. In the former case, only small numbers of individuals can financially afford education, 
accordingly all of them take education and become skilled, Ht = Frzow, and the dynamics 
of aggregate ransfers follow Bt+1 = B(Frlou„ Bt) for any Bt in the figure. If Frt remains 
unchanged, the transfers converge to B*(Frtow) in the long run. In contrast, when Frt = 
Frhigh, many people can take education. Consequently, if Bt is sufficiently large, i.e. Bt > 
He-1(Frhigh) = {Bt : wH - (1 + r)e = wL(Frhigh, Bt)}, not all of them become skilled 
Ht = He(Bt) < Frt, and the dynamics follow Bt+1 = B(He(Bt), Bt). In this case, the 
transfers converge to B** if Frt does not change. As Frt becomes larger, Bt+1 = B(Frt, Bt) 
shifts upward, and the range of Bt where the dynamics are governed by Bt+1 = B(He(Bt), Bt) 
expands. 
3.2.2. Dynamics of Frt 
Next the dynamics of the proportion of people who can afford to take education, Frt, are 
examined for given Bt. Actually, the dynamic equation relating Frt to Frt+1 depends on the 
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known without the complete information on the distribution. However, whether Frt changes 
or not and whether it increases or decreases can be discerned only with the information of 
the two aggregate variables Bt and Frt, and this qualitative, information on the dynamics is 
enough to obtain the main results of the model. 
  Assume that (1 - YA - /M)WH > e, i.e. B** = bs > e, is satisfied 23. Then, Frt is 
non-decreasing over time, since bZt+1 > eis satisfied whenever bt > e is true (See Figure 3.3). 
  First, considerthe unequal opportunity case. Remember that Ht = Frt is satisfied in this 
case. Whether Frt is constant or increases over time is determined by the relative position 
of bu(Frt, Bt) to e. When bu(:) < e, any children of unskilled workers do not receive transfers 
larger than e, so Frt is constant (See Figure 3.3). In contrast, when bu(:) > e is satisfied, 
Frt+i > Frt holds, since education becomes affordable to children of unskilled workers over 
time (See Figure 3.4). Of course, how much Frt+1 increases depends on the exact distribution 
of transfers over the population and is impossible toknow only with the information on Frt 
and Bt. 
  Alternatively, in the equal opportunity case, the return from education is equated with 
the return from assets, i.e. Ht = He(Bt) < Frt. Hence, individual transfers of both skilled
b
 23Note that this assumption does not place any restrictions on the manufacturing productivity. Since e 
is proportional to WH, it can be expressed as e = sewH, where se is a constant. Hence the assumption can 
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and unskilled workers change over time according tobZt+l = bs(bt), and Frt+l > Frt is 
satisfied.
3.2.3. Joint dynamics of Frt and Bt 
Now the dynamics of Frt and Bt are analyzed together by introducing the phase diagram 
(Figure 3.5), in which the x-axis takes Fr and the y-axis takes B. The feasible combinations 
of Fr and B are equal to the area bound by Fr =.0, Fr = 1, and B = eFrt. The economy 
must satisfy B > eFr because Fr is defined as the fraction of individuals who have received 
transfers bz larger than the cost of education e. 
  The diagram is divided into two regions, one corresponding to the unequal opportunity 
case and the other region for the equal opportunity case. The locus dividing the two cases 
is Fr = H'(B). The region below the locus is the unequal opportunity case, where all the 
individuals who can afford education take education and become skilled workers , i.e. H = Fr. 
The region above it is the equal opportunity case, where the number of skilled workers is 
determined so that the return from education is equated with the return from assets, i.e. 
H = HC(B) < Fr. 
  In the unequal opportunity case, the direction of motion of B is determined by the 
position of current (Frt, Bt) relative to B = B*(Fr). When the current economy is located 
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it increases over time 24. The direction of the change of B in each region is expressed with 
vertical arrows. As for the direction of change of Fr, it is determined by the current location 
of (Frt, Bt) relative to b* (Frt, B) = e. In the region below the line, b* (:) < e is satisfied, 
accordingly Frt+l = Frt holds, while in the region above and on the line, bu(:) > e, hence 
Frt+l > Frt is satisfied25. 
  Alternatively, in the equal opportunity case, the direction of motion of B is determined 
by the relative location to B = B**. In the region above B = B**, Bt decreases, and in 
the region below, it increases". The direction of change of Fr is simple in this case, and 
Frt+l > Frt is always satisfied27. 
  With this diagram, qualitative properties of transitional dynamics and long-run outcome 
of the aggregate variables (Fr, B) are transparent. Except for a few unimportant cases, 
they are completely known only with the knowledge ofcurrent position of (Frt, Bt) on the 
 24The dynamics are governed by Bt+i = B(Frt, Bt), (3.9).  25The xact dynamics are known only if the complete information f the distribution f ht over the 
population is available, so as the dynamics of Ht. 
 261n this case, the dynamics are determined by Bt+i = B(H'(Bt), Bt), (3.11). 
 27Again the characterization f the exact dynamics requires the complete information on the wealth dis-
tribution, but now the dynamics of Ht can be known completely since Ht = H'(Bt) is satisfied.
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diagram. The detailed analyses of the dynamics are given in Appendix I. 
4. Analyses 
4.1. Initial .distribution and long-run economic structure 
Using this diagram, the relationship between the initial wealth distribution and the long-run 
structure of the economy along with its transition can be easily investigated. 
  First, consider an economy that attains equal opportunity from the beginning, whose 
initial position is in the region on and above Fr = HC(B) on the diagram. The number 
of skilled workers is determined so that the returns from the two investment opportunities 
are equated, that is, WH - (1 + r)e = WL(He(B), B) and H = HC(B) hold. Both skilled 
and unskilled workers earn the same level of earnings (net of the cost of education), so 
education become affordable to children of unskilled workers over time (Fr increases). The 
result is that, unless the economy starts with Fro < Frt, it converges to (Fr, B) = (1, B**) 
for certain, where not only the net earnings but also net income and wealth are equalized 
and bi = b* holds. Thus perfect equality isattained. The long-run outcome of the economy 
with the initial condition Fro < Frt depends on . the exact initial distribution. If wealth is 
highly concentrated in the rich, then Fr would increase only slightly and the economy would 
regress to the unequal opportunity case (crosses the line Fr = He(B)). Otherwise, it would 
converge to (1, B**) in the long run. 
  Next examine the case where the economy starts from the state where the return from 
education ishigher than the return from assets (unequal opportunity case), but children of 
unskilled workers gain access to education over time, i.e. b(Fro, Bo) > e. As is clear from 
the diagram, if the initial condition satisfies Fro > Frt, more individuals obtain education 
and hence become skilled workers over time. As the number of skilled workers increases 
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers diminishes, o does wealth inequality, 
as long as Bt does not decrease greatly 28. And the production and employment shares of 
manufacturing rise, while those of agriculture fall. Eventually the economy reaches the equal 
opportunity case and perfect equality is attained in the long run. When initial inequality 
is relatively high, i.e. Fro < Frt, the long-run outcome depends on the exact information 
 2SWhen the economy is in the region below B = B*(Fr), aggregate transfers increase over time, so 
inequality always falls.
-23-
on the initial distribution. If the distribution is too concentrated in the few rich, then 
the number of skilled workers increases only slightly over time, and it is possible that the 
economy crosses b*(:) = e. 
  The unequal opportunity case where children of unskilled workers cannot have access to 
education, i.e. b*(:) < e, is a stagnant state. Since the number of skilled workers does not 
increase, the production and employment shares of the sectors remain constant. In particular, 
if the initial condition is Fro < Frt, the economy ends up with the same number of skilled 
workers Fro and aggregate transfers levels B*(Fr°). Unequal opportunity and inequality 
persist in the long run. If the economy begins with Fro > Frfi, its long-run prospect is 
much brighter. While its assets accumulation is low., poor people cannot afford education 
and hence the number of skilled workers remains constant; but after a certain amount of 
assets accumulation, the economy transits to bu(:) > e and the sectoral shift starts. In the 
long run, it .attains equal opportunity and perfect equality of earnings and wealth. 
  The analysis has shown that there is a clear-cut negative relationship between i equality 
of initial wealth distribution and long-run growth and inequality. Here the measure of 
inequality is a fraction of individuals who have enough resources to take education, Fr". 
Thus, a size of 'middle class' of an economy matters for growth through sectoral change. If
initial (aggregate) wealth is very low, too much equality is not good for long-run economic 
outcome. Further, the minimum level of wealth accumulation (B° > Frte) is needed for the 
sectoral shift to happen. The economy starting below this minimum level remains stagnant 
with any initial distribution. 
4.2. Comparisons among long-run equilibria 
There are two kinds of steady state equilibria, (Fr,.,, BSS) = (1, B**) and (Fr, B*(Fr)), 
where Fr < Frt. In the former equilibrium, the number of skilled workers is H**, skilled 
wage (net of the cost of education) is equal to unskilled wage, and all the individuals hold 
the same level of wealth, 1 (b8)*30. On the other hand, in the latter type of equilibria, 
                               1-7A- YM 
the number of skilled workers is Fr (< Frt < H**), skilled wage is higher than unskilled 
wage, and the wealth of skilled workers 1_ 1- (b8)* is larger than that of unskilled workers                                         7A7M 
  29When the economy starts with the conditions P'ro < Frt and b.* (1+0, B°) > e, the more detailed 
information the initial wealth distribution is required to find out its long-run outcome. 









1_yA_y~1 b* (Fr,B* (Fr)). The relative price of agricultural goods P(H, B*(H)) is increasing 
in H, so as WL (H, B* (H)) and b* (H, B* (H)). Hence, these steady state equilibria can be 
ranked in terms of the wage and wealth of unskilled workers, which are also measures of 
inequality between skilled and unskilled workers31, and the total wealth of the economy32 
The best equilibrium is (1, B**), then among equilibria (Fr, B*(Fr)), Fr < FO, one with 
higher Fr is better. 
  Note that wages and wealth are measured in terms of manufacturing goods, and the 
relative price of agricultural goods is different across equilibria, so they are not best measures 
of people's welfare. For accurate welfare comparisons, the utility of each type of individuals 
is computed. At equilibrium. (1, B**), both skilled and unskilled workers have the same 
utility level, which is: 
                              'YA 'YM 1 1
A-'YM 
       U(1, B**) _ 'YA IYRI (1 -'YA -CAI) (A)IA[wH -(1 + r)e]1-'iA. (4.1)                1-(1-1'A-7M)(1 +r) 
At equilibria (Fr, B*(Fr)), Fr < Frt, the utility of skilled workers is given by: 
                                          1 - H** Fr 
            U3(Fr,B*(Fr))=U(1,B**)•( )_yA (4.2) 
                                    H 1-Fr 
US(Fr, B*(Fr)) > U(1, B**) is satisfied since Fr < H**. Skilled workers have higher utilities 
than at equilibrium (1, B**) because agricultural goods are cheaper. In contrast, unskilled 
workers have lower utilities than at (1, B**) : 
             U.,,(Fr, B*(Fr)) = U(1, B**) • (1 ** r (4.3)                                    H 1 - Fr 
Note that U, (FT-, B*(Fr)) is decreasing and Uu(Fr, B*(Fr)) is increasing inFr, so inequality 
in welfare decreases with Fr. The average utility, which can be interpreted as the expected 
utility of an individual before birth, is given by the following expression: 
           E[U(H, B*(H))] = U(1, B**) (H 1-yA( 1 - H 1-7A. (4.4)                                          **) 1 - H**) 
 i1Remember that he wage and wealth ofskilled workers are the same inall the steady state quilibria. 
 32The total wealth at equilibrium (1, B**) is equal to 1_yAl_ YM(b3)*, while at equilibria (Fr, B* (Fr)), 
Fr < Frt, it is equal to 1_yA IM (b8)* H " .
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The .average utility is strictly increasing in H and attains the highest value at H = H**. 
Hence the ranking among the steady state equilibria remains unchanged if the average utility 
is used for the comparison.
4.3. Mechanism behind the model 
The mechanism of the model yielding the above results can be explained intuitively by the 
following illustration. Consider an economy in which skilled workers are scarce (Ho = Fro < 
H**) and assets accumulation is low (Bo < B* (Ho)) . How can this economy increase its 
income level? One way is through assets accumulation. Since the economy starts with a low 
assets level, people increase assets holdings over time. The increased assets raise the demand 
for agricultural goods, the price of the goods, and the unskilled wage. The higher unskilled 
wage increases savings by unskilled workers, which further increases assets accumulation. 
This process continues until aggregate assets reach the steady state level. However, with 
the number of skilled workers remain constant, he income increase is moderate since the 
ultimate source of assets accumulation is labor income. Further, inequality between skilled 
and unskilled workers remains large because the investment opportunities are constrained 
by family income. 
  Thus, in order to attain a large income growth, an increase in the number of skilled work-
ers and the sectoral shift of production and employment from agriculture to manufacturing 
is crucial. The sectoral shift starts if some children of unskilled workers receive nough re-
sources to take education. Since unskilled workers are in the agriculture sector, the unskilled 
wage and hence the relative price of agricultural goods must be above critical levels for the 
sectoral change to start. The agricultural price positively depends on the number of skilled 
workers and aggregate assets, since the more skilled worker imply higher demand and lower 
supply of the goods and larger assets accumulation means higher demand. So the number 
of skilled workers and/or aggregate assets must be above certain levels for the 'take-off'. 
  When the economy begins with a relatively equal initial wealth distribution (Fro > FO), 
there are more skilled workers, thus higher total labor income and larger assets accumulation 
for the next period. As a result, the relative price of agricultural goods is higher. If the 
combination of Fro and Bo satisfies bu(Fro, Bo) > e, then a relatively wealthier portion 
of unskilled workers can get their children to take education and the sectoral shift starts
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immediately. If not, initially children of unskilled workers cannot access education i itially, 
but as asset accumulation continues, the relative price eventually reaches the crucial level 
and the sectoral change starts. Once the sectoral shift starts, it continues autonomously. An 
increase inthe number of skilled workers aises the demand for agricultural goods, reduces 
its supply, and also raises assets accumulation. All contribute oa further rise in the price of 
agricultural goods. Then children of less affluent unskilled workers gain access to education 
and the number of skilled workers increases further, which raises the price of the goods more 
and even apoorer portion of unskilled workers can send their children to school. As long as 
the skilled wage (net of the cost of education) is higher than the unskilled wage, financially 
eligible children take education a d become skilled workers. Consequently this sectoral shift 
continues until the relative price of agricultural goods increases to a point where net wages of 
skilled and unskilled workers are equated. Once equal opportunity is attained, the-unskilled 
wage does not change, but as far as aggregate assets increases, the demand for agricultural 
goods increases and the sectoral shift continues. The sectoral shift ends after aggregate 
transfers reach the steady state level B**. 
  In contrast, when the economy starts with a relatively unequal assets distribution (Fro <. 
Frt), the initial number of skilled workers i  small and hence the relative price of agricultural 
goods is low. Children of unskilled workers are not financially eligible for education and 
cannot become skilled workers. Still the relative price increases over time through assets 
accumulation but never reaches the critical level for the sectoral shift. With the number 
of skilled workers constant, the inequality between skilled and unskilled workers does not 
disappear, and the economy ends up with the equilibria with the lower output and less equal 
distribution (Fr, B*(Fr)), Fr < Frt. 
  When initial assets accumulation is relatively high (Bo > B*(Ho)), the relative price 
of agricultural goods and the unskilled wage is higher for given Fro, so the sectoral shift 
occurs more easily. However, unless the initial wealth inequality is small (Fro > Frt), the 
convergence to the best steady state is not assured. This is because the ultimate source 
of assets accumulation is labor income. Since the initial assets accumulation is more than 
labor income can support in the long run, there is a tendency for assets to decrease over 
time. As a consequence, if wealth inequality is high, and as a result, the number of skilled 
workers increases only moderately, assets accumulation decreases over time and the economy
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converges to an unequal steady state.
4.4. Productivity growth 
Now productivity growth is introduced into the model to see if the results are robust to 
this modification. Assume that agricultural productivity grows at a constant rate of gA and 
manufacturing productivity grows steadily at gm. With the given constant interest rate r, 
the wage of skilled workers now grows at (gm) ctn1 and the unskilled wage grows at gA + gP,t, 
where gP;t is the time-variant growth rate of the relative price at period t. 
  Individual's investment decisions follow the same rules as before, but now that the wages 
are growing over time, cost of education also should grow. Since the cost of education of 
generation t, et is assumed to be proportional to the skilled wage in period t - 1, WH,t_1, it
is given by et = SeWWH,t-1. For simplicity, assume that se is constant overr time33 
  All the equations describing the individual and aggregate dynamics are the same as 
before. The difference is that there are no fixed points for the dynamics because of the 
productivity growth. However, by dividing both sides of these dynamics by { (ghf) ~m }t and 
redefining the variables accordingly, the modified dynamics can be analyzed in a similar way 
as before34. For the modified dynamics, the qualitatively same phase diagram can be drawn, 
hence all the results go through with this change35
 33The vidence shows that, although teacher-student ratios increase with per capita income, the increase 
is much smaller compared to the increase in enrollment rates, especially atthe secondary level (Schultz, 
1989). 
 34The variables are redefined asfollows: 
                                  wH = 4UH,tl{(9nr) «,,, }t, 
                                 e = et/{(9M) __I }t-1, 
                           M = htl {(gM) }t-1, 
                          Bt = Bt/{(gm)-}t-1, 
                   and P(Ht, Bt) = P(Ht)Bt)/f(9M)7_7}t 
With this redefinition f the variables, the modified dynamics for the economy with productivity growth are 
different from the respective dynamics for the economy with constant productivity only in one respect. That 
is, now 1 + r is replaced by (1 +,r)/(gm)
350f course, the steady state number of skilled workers inthe equal opportunity case, H**, and the critical 
size of 'middle class' for the 'take-off', Frt, increase with the growth rate of manufacturing productivity, 
gm. That is, with the higher manufacturing productivity growth, an economy suceeding in the sectoral shift 
can have more skilled workers in the long run, but it becomes more difficult for an economy with a small 
size of 'middle class' to initiate the 'take-off'.
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5. Introducing sectoral shift of consumption 
The analysis o far has employed the Cobb-Douglas utility function, and hence has abstracted 
from the sectoral shift of consumption from agriculture (and unskilled-intensive service) to 
manufacturing (and skilled-intensive service). It is the stylized fact that consumers spend 
more of their incomes on manufacturing oods and transfers as they become richer36. In this 
section, the utility function is modified so that this feature can be observed in the model. 
After this modification, agricultural productivity as well as initial wealth distribution become 
determinants of the long-run structure of the economy. In particular, it is shown that if an 
economy's agricultural productivity is sufficiently low, it ends up in a steady state with low 
output and high inequality regardless of its initial wealth distribution. 
5.1. Model 
5.1.1. Individual decisions and price determination 
The modified utility function takes the following form: 
                   Ut = (c ,t - CA )"A(C16I,t)ryn.1(bt+l)1-7A-7b1I (5.1) 
where cA is a constant. cA can be interpreted as the minimum consumption level of agri-
cultural goods needed for subsistence. A consumer maximizes his new utility subject to the 
budget constraint, 
                  PtcA,t + cn,t + bt+1 =wt + (1 + r)at, (5.2) 
where at is investment i  assets made in the previous period (childhood) and wt + (1 + r)at 
is given by37: 
           Wt + (1 + r)at = WL,t + (1 + r)bt, if bt < et, (5.3) 
                       = WH,t -(1 + r)et + (1 + r)bi, if bt > et. (5.4)
 "See, for example, Syrquin (1988), p.231. 
 37Further, when the returns from the two investment opportunities are equated, wH,t-(1+r)et+(1+r)bt = 
WL.t + (1 + r)bt is satisfied.
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  By solving the maximization problem, the following consumption and transfer rules are 
obtained:
                Pt ca,t = 'YA[W~t + (1+ r)at] + (1 -'YA)PtCA, (5.5) 
                 cnr,t = 'YM{~~t + (1+ r)at - PtcA], (5.6) 
              and bt+1 = (1 -'YA -'YM)[~~t + (1 + r)at - PtcA]. (5.7) 
The consumer first spends his income to purchase the subsistence level of agricultural goods 
PtcA, then allocates the rest of the income to the goods and transfers infixed proportions. 
As income grows, the share of wealth wt + (1 + r)at spent on agricultural goods decreases 
and the shares pent on manufacturing goods and transfers increase, if the agricultural price 
Pt does not grow as fast as the income. Also the price elasticity of agricultural goods is less 
than one, while those of manufacturing goods and transfers are larger than one. 
  Initially the model is presented assuming no productivity growth. Then, since the market 
structure is the same as before, wages of skilled workers and of unskilled workers are given 
by the same equations, and the skilled wage is time-invariant: 
                         wx = aMM 1 (1 - am) (5.8) 
r 
                      and WL,t = PtA. (5.9) 
  The market clearing condition of agricultural goods is different from the one in the 
previous model because of the term with PtcA : 
          PtALt ='YA[WL,tLt + WHHt + (1 + r)KD] + (1 -'YA)PtcA. (5.10) 
Remember that Lt is the number of unskilled workers, Ht is the number of skilled workers, 
and KD is total physical capital held domestically. Substituting (5.9), Lt = 1 - Ht, and 
KD = Bt-eHt into the above quation, and solving it for Pt, the relative price of agricultural 
goods is given by, 




It is assumed that agricultural productivity is high enough (A > cA) so that he economy can 
support at least the subsistence level of consumption c°A, if the whole population is engaged 
in agriculture38. With the presence of cA, higher agricultural productivity A decreases Pt 
more than proportionally, because, as income grows, people start spending less portions of 
their incomes on agricultural goods. 
5.1.2. Individual dynamics 
In the unequal opportunity case, i.e. when WH - (1 + r)e > wL(Frt, Bt) is satisfied, transfers 
of skilled workers are determined by the following equation, which isobtained bysubstituting 
(5.4) and Ht = Frt into (5.7), 
         bZt+1 = bs (b'; Frt, Bt) 
             C1-'YA - ''Ni){[wH - (1 + r)e] + (1 + r)ht - P(Frt, Bt)cA}. (5.12) 
Now the equation depends negatively on the size of 'middle class' Frt and aggregate transfers 
Bt through Pt. Increases in Frt and Bt raise the price of agricultural goods, so more income 
must be spent to purchase the subsistence level of the goods, resulting in lower spending on 
transfers. The fixed point of the equation for given P(Frt, Bt), bs(Frt, Bt), is equal to, 
     bs(Frt, Bt) _ 1 -'YA {[wH - (1 + r)e] - P(Frt, Bt) CA}. (5.13) 
  As for unskilled workers, dynamics of transfers are governed by the following equation, 
which is obtained bysubstituting (5.3) and Ht = Frt into (5.7), 
     ht +1 = b (ht; Frt, Bt) = (1 - -YA -'YA7){(1 + r')bZt + (A - cA)P(Frt, Bt)}. (5.14) 
The dynamic equation for unskilled workers depends positively on Frt and Bt through Pt, 
since the positive effect of the higher agricultural price on their earnings exceeds the negative 
effect on spending on the subsistence level of agricultural goods. The fixed point for given
38 With this assumption A(1 - Ht) - cA > 0 is satisfied inan equilibrium.
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P(Frt, Bt), b*(Frt, Bt), is given by,, 
          b* (Frt, Bt) = 1_7A -'YM [(A - cA)P(Frt, Bt)]' (5.15)                1-(1-'YA-'YM)(1+r) 
   In the equal opportunity case, i.e. when WH - (1 + r)e < wL(Frt, Bt) holds, transfers of
both types of workers follow bZt+1 = b(bZt) 
0 
       bZt+1= b(b2t)  (1- -rA -'YM){(1 + r)bZt + [wx - (1 + r)e](1- A)}. (5.16) 
The equation isobtained by substituting P(Ht, Bt) = [WH - (1 + r)e]/A into the transfer 
dynamics for the unequal opportunity case. The fixed point of the equation b* is equal to, 
            b*_ - 1 -'YA -'Yns [wH - (1 + 0e](1 - A). (5.17)                1 (1 'YA 'YM)(1 + r) 
   The combinations of Frt and Bt satisfying WH - (1 + r)e = wL(Frt, Bt) separate he two 
cases. The dividing line is obtained by substituting Pt = [WH - (1 + r)e]/A and Ht = Frt 
into (5.11) and solving the equation for Frt: 
           Frt=He(Bt)=(1-'YA)(1-c°A/A)- 'YA  +r r) (5.18) 
5.1.3. Dynamics of aggregate transfers 
In the unequal opportunity case, dynamics of aggregate transfers Bt follow the same equation 
as before, 
       Bt+1 = B(Frt, Bt) . 1 'YA - 'YM {[WH - (1 +0 e]Frt + (1 + r)Bt}. (5.19) 
                                      1 -'YA 
The fixed point of the equation for given Frt is equal to B*(Frt) - [1 - 1-1 - M (1 +r)]-1 x 
1-'YA-_fM [WH - (1 + r) e] Frt as before.    1-yA 
  In the equal opportunity case, the dynamics are described by Bt+1 = B(He(Bt), Bt), 
which is obtained by substituting Ht = He(Bt) into Bt = B(Ht, Bt): 
   Bt+1 = B(He(Bt),  _ (1.- !A - TM){[WH - (1 + r')e](1- A ) + (1 + r)Bt}. (5.20)
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The fixed point of this equation B** is given by, 
0 
           B** _ - 1 - 'YA - 'Ynl 7 [wH - (1 + r) e] (1 - A ), (5.21)               1 (1 'YA 'YM)(1 + ) 
which is equal to b*. The number of skilled workers at B**, H** - H(B**) is: 
                                                             ~o           H** _H(B**) = [1 - 1 - 'YA 1 + r ](1 - A ). (5.22)                             1- ( 'YA 'YILf)( ) 
5.1.4. Joint dynamics of Frt and Bt 
As before, joint dynamics of Frt and Bt, and relationship between initial wealth distribution 
and long-run performance of an economy are investigated using a phase diagram. Unlike 
the previous model, now the qualitative nature of the dynamics depends on agricultural 
productivity. 
Case of high agricultural productivity: When agricultural productivity is large enough 
that A[(1-'yA -'ynr)WH - e] > (1 -'fA -'yM) [WH - (1 +r)e]cA is satisfied, the phase diagram 
looks like the one in Section 3 (Figure 3.5)39. Remember that, on the diagram, the feasible 
combinations of Fr and B are equal to the area bound by Fr = 0, Fr = 1, and B = eFr. 
The region below Fr = He(B) is the unequal opportunity case and H = Fr is satisfied, while 
the region on and above the locus is the equal opportunity case and H = HC(B) < Fr holds. 
The direction of change of B is determined by the current location of (Frt, Bt) relative to 
B = B*(Fr) in the unequal opportunity case, and the location relative to B = B** in the 
equal opportunity case. The direction of change of Fr is determined by the current position 
of (Frt, Bt) relative to b* (Fr, B) = e. As before, bu(:) = e is located below Fr = He(B), and 
B** = b* > e is satisfied4o 
  The qualitative nature of the dynamics is the same as the original economy. That is, 
when the economy starts with a relatively equal initial wealth distribution, it converges to 
(Fr, B) = (1, B**), where perfect equality is achieved, and when the economy begins with 
  39There are only two differences from the economy without sectoral shift of consumption. First, Fr = 
He (B) shifts inwards by factor (1 - `A ). Second, the slope of b. *(Fr, B) = e becomes steeper bythe presence 
of (1 -A ). The intercept of the line is the same asbefore. 
  40This condition is equivalent to the above condition on agricultural productivity and the condition that 
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             Figure 5.1: Economy with low agricultural productivity 
an unequal wealth distribution and/or too small aggregate wealth, it converges to one of 
(Fr, B) = (Fr, B*(Fr)) (Fr < Frt), where the return from education is higher than that 
from assets, and consequently inequality between skilled and unskilled workers is persistent . 
Case of low agricultural productivity: On the other hand, when A[(1-ryA--YM)WH-
e] < (1--YA - •yns) [WH - (1 + r) e] cA is satisfied, that is, when agricultural productivity is rela-
tively small, the phase diagram looks like Figure 5.1. Unlike the previous case, b* (Fr, B) = e 
is located above Fr = Hc(B), hence bu(H, B) < e is satisfied for all the feasible combinations 
of (H,. B)41, while b* (Fr, B) = e is located below Fr = He(B)42. Consequently, descendants 
of unskilled workers never have enough assets to become skilled workers. Since b*(Fr, B) 
is decreasing in Fr and B, in the region above b* (Fr, B) = e, b* (:) < e is satisfied and 
Frt+l < Frt holds, while in the region below the line, bs(:) > e and Frt = Frt hold. On the 
diagram, the value of Fr at the intersection f B = B*(Fr) and bs(:) = e is denoted by FT-*. 
 41The condition on agricultural productivity is equivalent to b* < e. As a result, in the equal opportunity 
case, b,* (H, B) = bu(He(B), B) = b* < e is satisfied. Then, V. (H, B) < e is satisfied for the unequal 
opportunity case as well, since b* (H, B) = bu (Fr, B) < bu (He (B), B). 




The detailed analysis of the dynamics is in Appendix I. 
  Using this diagram, relationship betweenn initial wealth distribution and an economy's 
long-run outcome is examined. The biggest difference from the results of the economy with 
high agricultural productivity or without sectoral shift of consumption is that equal oppor-
tunity and perfect equality are not sustained in the long run. In the equal opportunity case, 
that is, in the region on and above Fr = HC(B) on the diagram, b* < e holds, so a proportion 
of individuals financially qualified for education decreases over time. Consequently the econ-
omy eventually moves to the unequal opportunity case. In the unequal opportunity case, as 
long as the economy is located above bs (Fr, B) = e, the number of skilled workers decreases 
over time. Thus, the long-run equilibria of the economy are (Fr, B) = (Fr, B*(Fr)), Fr < 
Fr*, where (net) skilled wage is higher than unskilled wage and unequal opportunity per-
sists. Among the steady state equilibria, one with higher Fr achieves higher equality between 
skilled and unskilled workers and higher total income. 
  In this economy, there is no clear relationship between initial distribution and long-run 
economic structure. Among the economies whose initial positions are on or below b* (Fr, B) _ 
e and Fro < FT-*, one with higher Fro achieves higher income and lower inequality in the 
long run. However, if the economy starts from the other regions, there is no such clear 
relationship. To which point the economy converges is dependent on the exact initial wealth 
distribution. Comparing two economies starting with different Fro, it is possible that the 
economy starting with higher Fro can end up with lower Fr in the long run.
5.2. Analyses 
With the introduction of the sectoral shift of consumption i to the model, the long-run out-
come of the economy becomes affected by agricultural productivity. When the productivity 
is high, the economy behaves qualitatively in the same manner as before. In contrast, when 
the productivity is low, regardless of initial wealth distribution, the economy ends up with 
(Fr, B) = (Fr, B*(Fr)), Fr < FT-*, where inequality between skilled and unskilled workers 
persists. Even if starting with a relatively equal distribution Fro > FT-*, the economy does 
not succeed in shifting employment and production from agriculture to manufacturing and 
converging to (1, B**) in the long run. 
  Why does not sectoral shift happen when agricultural productivity is low? The require-
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ment for the industrialization is sizable wealth accumulation by a portion of unskilled workers 
so that they can send their children to school. How does the lower productivity affect their 
transfers? With the introduction of the sectoral shift of consumption, now people have Z to 
consume atleast cA units of agricultural goods irrespective of its price, and as a result, the 
price elasticity of demand for the goods is less than one. Consequently, when agricultural 
productivity is lower, its price becomes higher more than proportionally and the unskilled 
wage is higher, other things being equal. This makes it easier for unskilled workers to spend 
on transfers. On the other hand, this price increase forces them to spend more on agricultural 
goods. The net effect is in favor of more transfers to children: now smaller 'middle class' 
and assets accumulation are sufficient for the sectoral shift to happen, i.e. bu(Fr, B) = e is 
located closer to the origin on the phase diagram. However, there is the other effect asso-
ciated with the lower productivity and the resultant higher unskilled wage: because of the 
fall of return to education for given Fr and B, the economy can sustain less skilled labor 
and aggregate assets under equal opportunity, i.e. Fr = He(B) is closer to the origin. If 
agricultural productivity is low enough, as in Figure 5.1, the second effect dominates the 
first effect, i.e. bu(Fr., B) = e is located above Fr = He(B), hence the sectoral shift never 
starts. 
  Further, the economy cannot keep an initial condition with sizable skilled labor (Fro > 
Fr*), because the agricultural price is too high for some of skilled workers to keep transfers 
sufficient for education. The number of skilled workers must decline until the price level falls 
enough that they can sustain the needed transfers. 
  The result shows that, when the sectoral shift of consumption is introduced, a certain level 
of agricultural productivity isa prerequisite for sectoral shift, and without such productivity, 
the economy isdestined to converge toa lower output steady state where inequality between 
skilled and unskilled workers persists. When, there is no sectoral shift of consumption, i.e. 
CA = 0, industrialization happens even when agricultural productivity is low, as long as the 
economy starts with a reasonably equal wealth distribution. This is because people always 
spend a fixed portion of their incomes on each of the goods and transfers, hence the rising 
agricultural price does not become an obstacle for industrialization.
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5.3. Productivity growth 
Introduction of productivity growth does not change the main results from this section, 
but unlike the economy without the sectoral shift of consumption, now the phase diagram 
is not qualitatively the same as the one without productivity growth. The reason is that 
Fr = He-(B- At), bs(Fr, B; At) e, and b*(Fr, B; At) = e shift upward over time as At 
increases. This complication brings some new phenomena to the dynamics. The detailed 
analysis is contained in Appendix II. 
  First consider the case where initial agricultural productivity is high so that the phase 
diagram at the initial period looks like the one in Section 3(Figure 3.5). When the initial size 
of 'middle class' is sufficiently arge or small, the results of the model without productivity 
growth go through. A new possibility arises when a proportion of individuals who can 
afford education i itially is of a middle size. In this intermediate range, an economy initially 
experiencing sectoral shift may end up in a low-output and high-inequality steady state. This 
can happen if wealth is relatively concentrated in the rich, and consequently anincrease in 
skilled labor cannot keep up with the outward shift of bu (:;At) = e resulting. from the 
productivity growth. Unskilled workers can increase transfers rapidly enough to keep up 
with a rising cost of education, if their income growth or the price fall of agricultural goods 
are fast enough. Given other things equal, the productivity growth makes the goods cheaper 
but decreases the relative wage of unskilled workers. It turns out that its net effect on their 
assets accumulation and transfers is negative, that is, growth of their transfers lag that of 
the cost of education. Thus the sectoral shift is halted if the number of skilled workers and 
aggregate assets do not increase rapidly enough to support he unskilled wage. 
  When initial agricultural productivity is low, the phase diagram at the initial period 
looks like the one presented earlier in this section (Figure 5.1). Obviously, the economy does 
not remain in this state forever, since the productivity growth eventually brings it to the 
high agricultural productivity case. However, it is very unlikely that the economy starting 
from this case can succeed in the sectoral shift and reaches the equal-opportunity steady 
state in the long run. While the economy is in this low productivity state, a size of 'middle 
class' is constant or decreases over time. If the economy enters the high productivity state 
with small Fr, industrialization never starts. But entering the high productivity state with 
sizable Fr requires large initial 'middle class' and rapid productivity growth in agriculture,
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those seem to be very unlikely for the very poor economy.
6. Conclusion 
There are two notable phenomena widely observed when an economy departs from an under-
developed state and starts rapid economic growth. One is the shift of production, employ-
ment, and consumption from agriculture and unskilled-intensive service to manufacturing 
and skilled-intensive service, and the other is a large increase in educational levels of its pop-
ulation. The question is why some economies have succeeded in such `structural change', but 
others do not. In order to examine the question, this paper has constructed an overlapping 
generations model that explicitly takes into account the sectoral change and human capital 
accumulation as sources of growth. 
  It has been shown that a relatively equal initial wealth distribution, or to be more accu-
rate, a sufficient size of ` middle-class' is a necessary condition for a successful sectoral shift. 
Once the economy initiates the 'take-off', the sectoral shift and human capital growth con-
tinue until it reaches the steady state, where equal opportunity is attained. However, when 
agricultural productivity is low, the economy does not succeed in the sectoral shift irrespec-
tive of the initial distribution. Thus sufficient agricultural productivity is a prerequisite for 
the success. 
  The main points of the paper, (i)importance of inequality, especially size of 'middle class', 
in economic development, and (ii)sufficient agricultural productivity as a precondition for 
successful sectoral shift, are largely supported by empirical studies, although supportive 
evidences on the second point are more indirect. It may be worthwhile to test this point in 
a more formal manner in future.
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7. Appendix I: Detailed analysis of aggregate dynamics 
7.1. Dynamics of aggregate variables when there is no sectoral shift of consump-
   tion or agricultural productivity is high 
This subsection describes the detailed ynamics of Frt and Bt, when there is no sectoral shift 
of consumption (cA = 0) or agricultural productivity is high, i.e. A[(1 - yA - y1)WH - e] > 
(1 - yA - yM) [wH - (1 + r) e] cA. As explained in the main text, both cases follow the same 
dynamics qualitatively. The phase diagram (Figure 3.5) is used for the explanation. 
  (I) Equal opportunity case (the region where (Fr, B) satisfies Fr > He(B)) 
  (i) The region where B < B** is satisfied. 
  Since bt > e implies bt+1 > e, Frt+l > Frt is satisfied. The dynamics of aggregate 
transfers follow Bt+1 = B(Hc(Bt), Bt), so if Bt = B**, Bt+1 = Bt = B**, and if Bt < B**, 
B** > Bt+1 > Bt hold. Hence when (Frt, Bt) _ (1, B**), the economy stays at this point 
forever. Otherwise, the economy continues tostay in this region and eventually converges 
to (1, B**). As is clear from the phase diagram, the economy never moves to the unequal 
opportunity case, where Fr < HC(B) is satisfied. It does not move to the region B > B** 
either, since Bt+1 < B** is true. 
  (ii) The region with B > B**. 
  In this region Frt+l > Frt and B** < Bt+1 < Bt are satisfied. There are two possibilities. 
If the distribution is relatively equal, the economy continues to stay in this region and 
converges to (1, B**) for the same reasons mentioned in (i). Especially when the economy 
is in the region Frt > H**, the convergence to (1, B**) is assured, which is straightforward 
from the diagram. If the distribution isrelatively skewed to the right tail, the increase of Frt 
is slow, so it moves to the unequal opportunity case (crosses Fr = He(B)) with B > B**.
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  (II) Unequal opportunity case (the region where Fr < H'(B) is satisfied) 
  (i) The region where bu(Fr, B) > e is satisfied. 
   In this region Frt is non-decreasing over time, as is clear from Figure 3.4. 
  a) Case B < B*(Fr) 
  Dynamics ofaggregate transfers follow Bt+1 = B_(Frt, Bt), so when Bt = B*(Frt), Bt+1 = 
Bt = B*(Frt), and when Bt < B*(Frt), B*(Frt) > Bt+1 > Bt hold. Eventually the economy 
shifts to the equal opportunity case with Fr > H**. Since B*(Frt) > Bt+1 and Frt+1 > Frt 
are satisfied, B*(Frt+1) > B*(Frt) > Bt+1 holds. So the.economy does not move to the 
unequal opportunity case with bu(Fr, B) > e and B > B*(Fr), or the equal opportunity case 
with Fr < H**. It does not stay in this region forever because then bt > e becomes satisfied 
for all the individuals eventually. 
  b) Case B > B*(Fr) 
  In this case B*(Frt) < Bt+1 < Bt holds. When Frt > Frt, the economy moves to a) or the 
equal opportunity case eventually43. When Frt < Frf, depending on the wealth distribution, 
the economy transits to a), the equal opportunity case, or the region with b* (Fr, B) < e. 
The last scenario happens if the distribution is unequal and Frt increases only slightly. 
  (ii) The region satisfying b* (Fr, B) < e. 
  Frt remains constant in this region. As is clear from the phase diagram, in the region 
Fr < Frt, the economy converges to (Frt, B*(Frt)). When B < B*(Fr), there is also the 
region with Fr > Frt. The economy in this region eventually moves to the region satisfying 
bu(Fr, B) > e and B < B*(Fr). 
7.2. Dynamics of aggregate variables when agricultural productivity is low 
This subsection describes the detailed dynamics of Frt and Bt, when agricultural productivity 
is low, i.e. A[(1- 7A -'YM)2wH - e] < (1 -1'A -'YM)[wH -(1 + r)e]cA in an economy with 
sectoral shift of consumption. The phase diagram (Figure 5.1) is used for the explanation. 
  (I) Equal opportunity case (the region where Fr > H'(B) is satisfied) 
 43The transition to a) is possible since B* (.b'rt+1) > Bt+i > B* (Frt) can happen.
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a
  Since bs (Frt, Bt) < e is satisfied, Frt decreases over time. As for aggregate ransfers, 
[B** Bt+1 Bt] Bt B**is satisfied. As a result, the economy transits to the unequal 
opportunity case eventually. 
  (II) Unequal opportunity case (the region where Fr < H'(B) is satisfied) 
  (i) The region above b*(Fr, B) = e. 
  Since bs(Frt, Bt) < e is satisfied, Frt decreases over time. 
  a) Case B < B* (Fr) 
  Aggregate transfers atisfy [B*(Frt) > Bt+i > Bt] Bt < B*(Frt). Eventually the 
economy transits to one of the three regions, the equal opportunity case, the unequal op-
portunity case with bs(Frt, Bt) < e and Bt > B*(Frt), or the unequal opportunity case with 
b*(Frt, Bt) > e. It does not stay in this region forever because if it continues tostay bt < e 
is satisfied for all individuals eventually. 
  b) Case B > B*(Fr) 
  In this case B* (Frt) < Bt+1 < Bt holds. So the economy unambiguously moves to the 
unequal opportunity case with bs(Fr, B) > e and B > B*(Fr) eventually. 
  (ii) The region on or below bs (Fr, B) = e. 
  Since bs(Frt, Bt) > e is satisfied, Frt is constant. When Bt > B*(Frt), Bt decreases over 
time and the economy converges to one of (Fr, B) = (Fr, B* (Fr) ), Fr < FT.* in the long 
run. When Bt < B*(Frt), Bt increases over time. If Frt < Fr*, the economy converges 
to one of (Fr, B) = (Fr, B*(Fr)), Fr < FT' in.the long run. In contrast, if Frt > FT-*, it 
transits to case (i), b). 
8. Appendix II: Economy with sectoral shift of consumption and 
  productivity growth 
This appendix analyzes the economy with sectoral shift of consumption and productivity 
growth in details. As in the main text, assume that the productivity of the agriculture sector 
grows at a constant rate of gA and that of the manufacturing sector grows steadily at gm. 
Individual's investment decisions follow the same rules as before, but now that the wages are 
growing over time, education cost also should grow. Since the cost of education of generation
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t, et is assumed to be proportional to the skilled wage in period t - 1, WH,t-1, it is given by 
et = SeWH,t-1• For simplicity, assume that se is constant over time. 
8.1. Dynamics 
8.1.1. Aggregate dynamics 
All the equations describing the individual and aggregate dynamics are the same as the econ-
omy without productivity growth, but they cannot be analyzed in the same way because of 
the technological change. For example, consider the dynamic equation of aggregate transfers 
in the unequal opportunity case: 
        Bt+1 = B(Frt, Bt) = 1 'YA -'Ynr{[WH,t -• (1 + r)et]Frt + (1 + 7-)Bt}. (8.1)                                        1-'YA 
Since WH,t and et grow over time, the equation does not have a fixed point for given Frt. 
  However, by dividing both sides of the above quation by {(gm) ;,z }t and redefining the 
variables, the modified equation can be analyzed in a similar way as before. The variables 
are redefined as follows: 
                                }t,                       WH = WH,t/{(gM)~-
                        e = et /{(gM) OLm }t-1~ 
                                                                          I t -1                          Bt Bt f (gm)Ct77I 
Then the modified equation isexpressed as, 
                 Bt+1 = B(Frt, Bt) 
                   -- 1 -YA rym {[wH - R(gM)e]Frt +R(gMr)Bt}, (8.2) 
                                     1-'YA 
        where R(gm) 1 + 1 (8.3) 
                      (gm) any 
where WH and e are now constants. There exists a fixed point for the equation given Frt,
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f
B*(Frt), which is defined as, 
                                            1-7A-7M 
                                         - R(9M)e]Frt. (8.4)               B*(Frt) = 
1 - "A 
                   - YMR (gm)                                ( A1                                                             1--/A 
  The unequal opportunity case is separated from the equal opportunity case by the com-
binations of Frt and Bt satisfying WH,t - (1 + r)et = wL,t(Frt, Bt). Remember that Frt is 
a proportion of individuals who have received transfers greater than the cost of education. 
Redefining the variables in the same manner, the modified equation satisfying this relation 
is given by, 
           Frt = He(Bt; At) = (1 -'YA)(1 - CA) - 'YAR(9nr)Bt (8.5)         A
t [WH - R(gm)e] 
He(Bt; At) is positively dependent onAt, because productivity growth in the agriculture 
sector reduces the price of agricultural goods more than proportionally, resulting in a lower 
unskilled wage and a higher eturn to education. Notice that when cA = 0, that is, when 
spending shares of consumers do not change with income growth, the dependence on At 
disappears. 
  The modified ynamic equation of Bt+1 in the equal opportunity case (Frt > He(Bt; At)) 
becomes, 
          Bt+1 = B(He(Bt, At), .Bt) 
                                                    CO             (1 -YA --YM){[WH - R(gm)e](1 - At) + R(gR(gm)Bt}. (8.6) 
Since At is increasing over time, Bt+1 = B(He(Bt; At), Bt) shifts upward, but. eventually it 
converges to Bt+1 = B(He(Bt; At), Bt) when cA = 0, whose fixed point is B** : 
                B** = 1 - ^A - 'YM [WH - R(gm)e]. (8.7)                      1- (1 -YA - -yM)R(gn1)
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8.1.2. Individual dynamics 
Individual dynamics too are modified b dividing both sides of the dynamics b 1 
and redefining the variables". In the unequal opportunity case, the modified dynamic equa-
tion of transfers for skilled workers is given by, 
             bit+1 = bs (bit, Frt, Bt; At) 
                 (1 -'YA-'YM){[w - R(gm)e] + R(gnr)bt-P(Frt, Bt; At)cA}, (8.8) 
             where 
    P Fr B ; A yA IwH-R(gM)e]Frt + R(gm)Bt. ( t, t, t) 1 _ -YA At (1 - Frt) - cA (8.9) 
Given Frt and Bt, it shifts upward over time with growth of At, but eventually converges to 
bZt+1 = bs(b2t) when cA = 0. The modified dynamic equation for unskilled workers is,
           bt+1 = bu(bZt, Fr Bt; At) 
                (1- ,YA--'M)I R(9hr)bt + (At - cA)P(Frt, Bt; At)}. (8.10) 
Given Frt and Bt, it shifts upward over time and converges to b'tt+l = bs(bt; Frt, Bt) when 
cA=0. 
  The dynamic equation for the equal opportunity case is modified as follows: 
0       b'tt+1 = b(btt; A ) =(1 -'YA-'YM){R(gM)b2t + [wH - R(9M)e](1- A)}. (8.11) 
  In sum, when the appropriate modifications are made, the dynamics an be described in 
a similar way as the case without technological hange. All the modified ynamics except 
Bt+1 = B(Frt, Bt) shift upward over time because of productivity growth in agriculture, and 
converge to the respective dynamics when cA = 0 in the long run. 
 "The variables are redefined asfollows. 
                       bt = btl{(gm) 
                   P(Ht) Bt; At) = P(Ht, Bt; At)1{(9nr) a }t.
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8.2. Results 
Joint dynamics of Frt and Bt, and relationship between initial wealth distribution and long-
run performance of an economy are investigated using a phase diagram as before. Additional 
complication arises since Fr = He(B; At), b*(Fr, B; At) = e, and b* (Fr, B; At) = e shift 
upward over time as At grows. The growth of agricultural productivity decreases the price 
of agricultural goods more than proportionally 45, hence the unskilled wage declines for given 
(Fr, B) and Fr = Hc(B; At) shifts outward. Locus bs(:; At) = e shifts outward, because 
cheaper agricultural goods make it possible for skilled workers to allocate more income 
on transfers. On the other hand, unskilled workers are affected both positively (by the 
price decline) and negatively (by the wage decrease), but the net effect is negative and 
bu(:; At) = e shifts upward 46. Denote the intersection ofFr = He(B; At) and B = B*(Fr) 
by (Fr** (At), B** (At) )47.
8.2.1. Economy with high agricultural productivity 
First, consider the case where an economy's initial agricultural productivity is large enough 
that Ao[(1 -'YA -'YNi)vwH - e] > (1 -'YA -'YM)[wH - R(gns)e]cA is satisfied (Figure 8.1)48. 
In this case, the phase diagram for given agricultural productivity looks like the diagram for 
the same case without productivity growth (Figure 3.5). The difference is that, over time, 
Fr = He(B; At) shifts outward parallelly, while b*(:; At) = e shifts outward with its intercept 
constant, and the both converge to the respective equations when cA = O.The phase diagram 
displays the both loci when agricultural productivity is at the initial level and at the long 
run level (t -+ oo). 
  The relationship between i itial distribution and long-run outcome isvery similar to the 
case without productivity growth. When the initial condition satisfies Fro > Frt, sectoral 
shift happens and the economy approaches (Fr, B) = (1, B**(At)) in the middle run and 
 45 As explained in the previous subsection, productivity growth inthe agriculture sector and the resulting 
income growth cause the shift of consumption fr m agricultural goods to manufacturing goods, resulting in 
the larger price decline than the case with cA = U. 
 46Remember that(14-, B) located above b,*,, (1+, B; At) = e satisfies bu(:) > e, while the region below 
by (Fr, B; At) = e satisfies by(:) > e. 
 47B** (At) is the fixed point of Bt+i = B(11' (Bt; At), Bt) for given At. 
 48This condition is equivalent to the condition that he fixed point of bit+i = b(bt; At), b*(At) is greater 
than e. It is also equivalent to the condition that b* (Fr, B; At) = e is located above Fr H' (B; At)..
-47-
BFr = He (BI Ao)
Fr = He (B; Ac,)
buAte) = e 
bu(:;Ao)=e
B = B*(Fr) 
      (H**, B**)
B=eFr
B = B** 
B = B**(Ao)
             0 Frt 1 Fr 
                Frt(Ao) 
  Figure 8.1: Economy with Productivity Growth: High Agricultural Productivity Case 
converges to (1, B**) in the long run. Accordingly the number of skilled workers approaches 
H** (At) in the middle run and converges to H** in the long run. In contrast, when the 
initial distribution satisfies Fro < Frt(Ao) and b*(:; Ao) < e, sectoral shift never happens 
and the economy converges to (Fr, B) = (Fr, B*(Fr)), Fr < Frt(Ao) in the long run. 
  What is new is the case where the economy starts with Fro E [Frt(Ao), Frt). In this case 
whether the convergence to (1, B**) succeeds ornot is dependent on the detailed information 
on the initial distribution. Even if the economy starts from the region b* (:; Ao) > e and its 
skilled labor increases initially, it may end up in a steady state (Fr, B*(Fr)), Fr < Frt. 
This can happen if wealth is concentrated in the few rich, and consequently, an increase 
in skilled labor cannot keep up with the outward shift of b* (:;At) = e resulting from the 
productivity growth. Unskilled workers can increase transfers rapidly enough to keep up 
with a rising cost of education, if their income growth or the price fall of agricultural goods 
are fast enough. Given other things equal, the productivity growth makes the goods cheaper 
but decreases the relative wage of unskilled wage. It turns out that its net effect on their 
assets accumulation and transfers is negative, that is, growth of their transfers lag that of 
the cost of education. Thus the sectoral shift is halted if the number of skilled workers and
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BFr = He (B; A00)
                  B = B*(Fr) 
            b,*,(:; Ate) = e (H**, B**) b* * (:; A
o) = e /
 Fr = He(B; Ao\ 
  b* (:; 10) Ve
B=eFr
B=B**
           0 Fro (Ao) Fr 1 Fr 
                 Frt (Ao) 
Figure 8.2: Economy with Productivity Growth: Low Agricultural Productivity Case
aggregate assets do not increase rapidly enough to support the unskilled wage. 
  Growth of agricultural productivity increases income and output, but for the successful 
sectoral shift, initial wealth distribution is critical as before. Because of the productivity 
growth, all the (original) variables except Fr grow over time in the long run; the wages, the 
individual and aggregate assets all grow at rate (gm)arm and the relative price of agricultural 
goods grows at (gm) anL /gA. Without he productivity growth, a rise of the relative price of 
agricultural goods is necessarily associated with sectoral shift, but now the relative price can 
decrease if gA is large enough.
i 
i
8.2.2. Economy with low agricultural productivity 
When an economy's initial agricultural productivity issmall so that Ao[(1-ryA-'YM)wH-e] <
(1 - yA - IYnf)[U)H - R(gn:I)e]co is satisfied, the phase diagram looks like Figure 8.2. The 
phase diagram with agricultural productivity fixed at the initial level is qualitatively the 
same as the diagram for the same case without productivity growth (Figure 5.1). That is, 
b. (Fr, B; AO) = e is located above Fr = He(B; AO), and b* (Fr, B; AO) = e is located below
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Fr = He(B; Ao)49. If the productivity remains at this level, the economy would converge to 
(Fr, B) = (Fr, B*(Fr)), Fr < Fr°(Ao) eventually. 
  Now, because of the productivity growth, as time passes, Fr = He(B; At) shifts outward 
parallelly, while b* (:; At) = e shifts outward with its slope increasing. Eventually b* (:; At) = e 
moves above Fr = He(B; At), and bu(:; At) = e moves below Fr = He(B; At). That is, the 
economy transits to the high productivity case examined above. 
  Is there any chance for this economy to converge tothe steady state with equal opportu-
nity? There is, but it is likely to be very small. Consider an economy that starts with small 
assets accumulation, i.e. Bo < B*(Fro). Suppose that the economy shifts to the high produc-
tivity case at period s. From this period, sectoral shift from agriculture to manufacturing be-
comes possible". For such sectoral shift to actually happen, the economy must be located at 
least above Frt (As) at period s. If the economy initiates with Fro < Frt (As), this condition 
is impossible to meet and. hence it will end up with (Fr, Bt) = (Fr, B* (Fr) ), Fr < Frt (AS) 
for certain. Even if the initial condition satisfies Fro > Frt (A5), skilled labor decreases until 
period s, so large initial Fro or high productivity growth is necessary at least. Further, for 
the sectoral shift to continue, skilled labor must increase rapidly enough over time to keep 
up with the outward shift of bu(:; At) = e resulting from the productivity growth. 
  In sum, the results obtained for the economy with fixed productivity mostly remain intact 
with. the introduction of productivity growth. So if the initial agricultural productivity is 
low, the economy is highly likely to end up with. a lower income steady state regardless of 
the initial distribution. In the model economy, tuition is assumed to be proportional to the 
skilled wage. If tuition becomes cheaper relative to the skilled wage as income grows, then 
the economy would converge to the steady state with equal opportunity in the long run. 
Still, if the reduction of the relative cost of education is not large, the economy starting 
with low agricultural productivity would have to spend many years until it reaches the best 
steady state.
 49Thus bu(H, B; A0) < e is satisfied for any H. 
 5OBefore this period the shift from manufacturing to agriculture happens if the economy is located above 
b* (:; At) = e.
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